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NOTES AND COMMENTS
and an "arbitrary rule"3 6 and judicial opinions have joined in assail-
ing the rule as archaic.17 The cause of death can now be accurately
fixed by competent medical testimony, whereas at the time of the
rule's inception the cause of death after more than a year and a day
was speculative.3" It is a curious irony that medical science has
advanced to the point that it may prolong life for long periods and
yet this miraculous advance could very well serve to exonerate a
murderer by simply prolonging his victim's life.
It is submitted that the legislature should take notice of this
ancient rule in light of current day medical standards and enact legis-
lation abolishing it. Many forms of legislation have been discussed,3 9
but a positive repudiation of the rule would best serve the ends of
justice. The rights of the accused would still be adequately pro-
tected, since the prosecution would still have the burden of proving
causation beyond a reasonable doubt. A positive repudiation of the
rule would serve to leave the issue of cause of death to the triers of
fact, rather than to a legal presumption forged some seven hundred
years ago that has long outlived its merit, logic and basis.
CARTER G. MACKIE
Criminal Law-Split Sentence-Trial Judge in North Carolina Not
Permitted To Impose Sentence Active in Part and Suspended in Part
The first probation law was enacted in Massachusetts in 1878;1
since that time changes in the philosophy of criminal punishment
have resulted in widespread use by courts of the suspended sentence.
The exact frequency of use of this type sentence is difficult to ascer-
tain because adequate statistical information is not compiled in a
large majority of the states. Figures complied by the Federal
CLARK & MARSHALL, LAW OF CRimFEs 536 (6th ed. 1958).
Head v. State, 68 Ga. App. 759, 24 S.E.2d 145 (1943) (should be ad-
justed by the legislature to conform to medical standards) ; Elliott v. Mills,
335 P.2d 1104 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959) (rule has run the "limit of its.
logic"); The King v. Dyson, [1908] 2 K.B. 454 (doubts present day merits.
of the rule).
8 See Elliott v. Mills, 335 P.2d 1104, 1114 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959)
(concurring opinion), where it was pointed out that at the time of the formu-
lation of the rule, life expectancy was not more than thirty-four years, while
today, expectancy is about sixty-nine years. Also, at the time of the rule's
inception medical science was in its infancy.
"'Id. at 1115.
'Mass. Acts 1878, ch. 198. See generally BARNES & TEETERS, NEW
HoIzoNs IN CRIMINOLOGY 554 (3d ed. 1959).
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Bureau of Prisons, however, reveal that approximately forty-two
per cent of the federal offenders sentenced in 1957 were placed on
probation.2
Since reformation of the criminal, and his ultimate return as a
useful member of society, is recognized as a dominant purpose of
criminal punishment, judges are becoming increasingly cognizant
that the suspended sentence often can work wonders in rehabilitation.
Probation assigns the criminal to the community, rather than to
prison, for the corrective period. A second chance to remain among
law-abiding citizens and to demonstrate habits that meet the approval
of society oftentimes will do more to bring about this desired
reformation than will a lengthy period behind prison walls. Es-
pecially is this true in the case of first-time or youthful offenders.
Early in the development of suspension and probationary prac-
tices considerable disagreement occurred among courts as to whether
power to suspend sentences existed independently of statute.3 The
United States Supreme Court reached the conclusion that such power
was not inherent in common law courts ;4 nevertheless, a respectable
minority of jurisdictions never subscribed to that view.5 North
Carolina early espoused the minority position that power to suspend
or respite a sentence was lodged as of common right in every tribunal
possessing jurisdiction to try criminal cases.6
Accordingly the suspended sentence was utilized in North Caro-
lina as early as 1894; in 1937, however, the legislature accorded
statutory sanction to the practice7 and also authorized imposition of
2 BARNES & TEETERs, op. cit. supra note 1, at 561.
See generally Grinnel, The Conmwon Law History of Probation, 32 J.
CnIm.. L. 15 (1941).
"Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916).
'E.g., Belden v. Hugo, 88 Conn. 500, 91 Atl. 369 (1914); People v.
Stickle, 156 Mich. 557, 121 N.W. 497 (1909) ; Matter of Hart, 29 N.D. 38,
149 N.W. 568 (1914); State ex rel. Gehrmann v. Osborne, 79 N.J. Eq. 430,
82 At. 424 (1911); People ex rel. Forsyth v. Court of Sessions, 141 N.Y.
288, 36 N.E. 386 (1894); Weber v. State, 58 Ohio St. 616, 51 N.E. 116
(1898).
'E.g, State v. Everitt, 164 N.C. 399, 79 S.E. 274 (1913); State v.
Hilton, 151 N.C. 687, 65 S.E. 1011 (1909). Power to suspend sentence was
expressly held to exist in the various inferior courts of the state as well as in
the superior courts. State v. Tripp, 168 N.C. 150, 83 S.E. 630 (1914).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-197 (1953). The statute provides: "After con-
viction or plea of guilty or nolo contendere for any offense, except a crime
punishable by death or life imprisonment, the judge of any court of record
with criminal jurisdiction may suspend the imposition or the execution of a
sentence and place the defendant on probation or may impose a fine and also
place the defendant on probation."
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certain terms of probation.' Consistent with the express language
employed, in this later statutory provision, the enumerated proba-
tionary conditions have been held to be "cumulative and concurrent
rather than exclusive."' Thus, though good behavior is the condi-
tion most commonly attached, 0 the trial judge has wide discretion
in selection of probationary conditions," and the terms imposed
generally have been approved unless considered to be unreasonable,
unenforceable, or oppressive.'
2
It should be noted that the granting of a suspended sentence may affect
a defendant's rights respecting appeal of a criminal conviction. Since an
order suspending a sentence is favorable to the defendant, his consent to
its entry is implied if he does not appeal immediately. By this consent his
right to appeal on the principal issue of his guilt or innocence is lost. He
may not thereafter complain that his conviction was without due process of
law; however, he may contest evidence showing a breach of conditions and
also raise the question of their reasonableness. State v. Miller, 225 N.C.
213, 34 S.E.2d 143 (1945).
8N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-199 (Supp. 1959). The statute provides: "The
court shall determine and may impose, by order duly entered, and may at any
time modify the conditions of probation and may include among them the
following, or any other; that the probationer shall: (1) Avoid injurious or
vicious habits; (2) Avoid persons or places of disreputable or harmful char-
acter; (3) Report to the probation officer as directed; (4) Permit the proba-
tion officer to visit at his home or elsewhere; (5) Work faithfully at suit-
able, gainful employment as far as possible and save his earnings above
his reasonably necessary expenses; (6) Remain within a specified area;
(7) Deposit with the clerk of the court a bond for his appearance at such
time or times as the court may direct; (8) Deposit with the clerk of the
court from his earnings a savings account in such installments and at such
intervals as the court may direct; and the clerk shall thereupon deposit such
funds in the savings account in an institution whose accounts are insured
by an agency of the federal government and the principal plus interest
earned shall be paid to the probationer upon his discharge or earlier upon
order of the court; (9) Pay a fine in one or several sums as directed by
the court; (10) Make reparation or restitution to the aggrieved party for the
damage or loss caused by his offense, in an amount to be determined by the
court; (11) Support his dependents."
' State v. Simmington, 235 N.C. 612, 614, 70 S.E.2d 842, 844 (1952).
"°E.g., State v. Gibson, 233 N.C. 691, 65 S.E.2d 508 (1951); State v.
Peterson, 228 N.C. 736, 46 S.E.2d 852 (1948); State v. Sullivan, 227 N.C.
680, 44 S.E.2d 81 (1947); State v. Marsh, 225 N.C. 648, 36 S.E.2d 244
(1945).
1 See, e.g., State v. Davis, 243 N.C. 754, 92 S.E.2d 177 (1956) (de-
fendant not to allow others to remain at her home after dark); State v.
Thomas, 236 N.C. 196, 72 S.E.2d 525 (1952) (defendant's car confiscated
and sold); State v. Smith, 233 N.C. 68, 62 S.E.2d 495 (1950) (defendant
prohibited from driving car for a year); State v. Pelley, 221 N.C. 487, 20
S.E.2d 850 (1942) (cease publication of material pertaining to stock sales) ;
State v. Smith, 196 N.C. 438, 146 S.E. 73 (1929) (talk about young girls
only in a complimentary manner).
"E.g., State v. Miller, 225 N.C. 213, 34 S.E.2d 143 (1945); State v.
Shepherd, 187 N.C. 609, 122 S.E. 467 (1924).
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Despite the overwhelming acceptance that employment of the
suspended sentence has gained, one particular variant of it, com-
monly designated a split sentence, has produced wide divergence of
opinion respecting its validity. The term has been employed by
courts to denote entirely different situations. For example, the
Maine court has used it to describe a sentence where a penalty of both
fine and imprisonment was initially imposed and where imprisonment
was suspended upon enforcement of the fine.13  On the other hand,
in North Carolina the term has been applied to instances where
the trial judge sought to make active in part and to suspend in part
the period of imprisonment inflicted. 4
The North Carolina Supreme Court first considered the pro-
priety of this type of judgment in State v. Lewis."5 Two defendants
were convicted of assault on a female with intent to commit rape.
The trial judge, after pronouncing sentence of four years in prison,
stipulated that they should be released upon serving two years and
be placed on probation for a five year period. On appeal the form
of the judgment was not objected to by the defendants ;1" neverthe-
less, the court, apparently on its own motion, came to grips with the
issue of the validity of the split sentence. The court stated: "We do
not doubt the wisdom and salutary effect of a judgment of this kind,
but we can find no authority for its rendition."'1
Although it recognized that power to suspend sentence existed
both inherently and through statutory authorization, the court was
of the opinion that suspension applied, at least where the sole pun-
ishment was imprisonment, only to the sentence as a whole. 8 In
striking down the judgment, the court regarded the split sentence in
" Cote v. Cummings, 126 Me. 330, 138 Ati. 547 (1927). The Maine court
took the position that a court cannot suspend a sentence of imprisonment
and enforce a fine imposed as part of the sentence. This result could not
be reached in North Carolina since payment of a fine as a condition of
suspension of sentence is expressly authorized by statute. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15-199 (Supp. 1959).
" State v. Lewis, 226 N.C. 249, 37 S.E.2d 691 (1946).
15226 N.C. 249, 37 S.E2d 691 (1946).
1" None of the defendants' exceptions touched on this point. Brief for
Appellants, pp. 1-6, State v. Lewis, supra note 15.
17226 N.C. at 251, 37 S.E.2d at 693.
" It is true that the North Carolina statute which provides for suspension
and probation, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-197 (1953), does not expressly stipu-
late whether trial judges have authority to suspend only part of a sentence.
See note 7 supra. However, when two separate offenses are involved, as in
the case of breaking and entering and larceny, it is common to require service
of sentence for one of the two counts and suspend sentence on the other.
[Vol. 40
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effect as an anticipatory parole which constituted an invasion of the
power of pardon, parole and discharge vested in the governor by the
constitution."9 The rule thus formulated in Lewis was vigorously
reapproved by the court in a later case.20
It is interesting to note that in Moore v. Patterson.,2' a case de-
cided three years before Lewis, the South Carolina Supreme Court
reached a diametrically opposed result respecting the validity of the
split sentence; this holding was grounded on construction of a
statutory provision22 virtually identical in its terms to the North
Carolina suspension and probation statute.' The defendant had been
sentenced to three years for a felony, and the trial judge had provided
that after he served one year the balance of the prison term be
suspended and that he then be placed on probation for three years.
The court upheld the judgment, reasoning that the legislature did
not intend to limit the judge's discretion by allowing them to suspend
only entire sentences. It is possible that, had argument concerning
the split sentence been presented in State v. Lewis, Moore would
have been cited and the interpretation of the similar statute con-
sidered by the North Carolina court.
Surveying the question of validity of the split sentence on a
nationwide basis, there seems to be a paucity of authority touching
the point in most of the states.24 Further, in those jurisdictions
where the issue has been directly presented the over-all situation
"° N.C. CoNsT. art. III, § 6 (1868): "The Governor shall have the power
to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, after conviction, for all
offenses (except in cases of impeachment), upon such conditions as he
may think proper, subject to such regulations as may be provided by law
relative to the manner of applying for pardons. He shall biennially com-
municate to the General Assembly each case of reprieve, commutation, or
pardon granted, stating the name of each convict, the crime for which he
was convicted, the sentence and its date, the date of commutation, pardon,
or reprieve, and the reasons therefor."
The court in Lewis conceded that it would be difficult to find in the
split sentence any direct conflict with the constitution; still it was deemed
to be within the spirit of that instrument to leave such matters entirely to the
chief executive. 226 N.C. at 251, 37 S.E.2d at 693.20In re Powell, 241 N.C. 288, 84 S.E.2d 691 (1954).
21203 S.C. 90, 26 S.E.2d 319 (1943).
"2 S.C. CODE ANN. § 55-591 (1952). The court's decision was based
squarely on the language of the statute. Unlike North Carolina, South Caro-
lina has never adopted the view that power to suspend sentences inheres in
courts possessing criminal jurisdiction. Moore v. Patterson, 203 S.C. 90, 93,
26 S.E.2d 319, 321 (1943).22 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-197 (1953). See note 7 szpra.
" See Annot., 147 A.L.R. 656 (1943).
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.generally has not been parallel to the consideration of the problem
presented by the North Carolina and South Carolina cases. "
Several considerations indicate that should this issue be presented
afresh the North Carolina Supreme Court might wish to re-examine
the reasoning of the Lewis case. Firstly, the court in deciding
Lewis did not allude to the language employed in G.S. § 15-197.
Seemingly a statutory provision authorizing suspension of sentence
in full would necessarily be broad enough in its terms to permit
suspension of part of the sentence. Further, judicial release of a
prisoner after he has begun serving his sentence is not a unique
concept in North Carolina;2 thus, allowance of the split sentence
would not seem to be an unwarranted extension of judicial power.
Secondly, a constitutional amendment adopted subsequent to any
decision on the validity of the split sentence divested the governor
of the parole power and placed it in a board of paroles created by the
legislature.17  This action removed the precise ground of consti-
tutional objection manifested in Lewis to the split sentence. Al-
though the same type of adverse argument might be put forward in
relation to the new constitutional provision, analysis reveals that
" California by express statutory provision vests trial judges with
authority to impose a sentence of imprisonment as a condition for subsequent
probation. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1203, 1203.1. Kentucky has disallowed
imposition of the split sentence. Woll v. Commonwealth ex rel. Meredith,
284 Ky. 783, 146 S.W.2d 59 (1940). It should be noted, however, that
in this jurisdiction the jury fixes the term of confinement. Louisiana has
refused to allow the judge to provide at the time sentence is imposed that
the prisoner be released on probation after serving a fixed period of the
prescribed term. However, after the prisoner is incarcerated and actually has
begun to serve the sentence, the judge may suspend on good behavior. State
v. Johnson, 220 La. 64, 55 So. 2d 782 (1951). The split sentence is pre-
cluded in New York by a statutory provision that imprisonment cannot be
interrupted once it has commenced. N.Y. CoNsoL. LAws ANN. art. 196,
§2188 (McKinney Supp. 1961). Oklahoma has held that suspension, if
granted, must apply to the entire judgment. State v. Smith, 83 Okla. Cr.
188, 174 P.2d 932 (Crim. Ct. App. 1946). Oregon has denied use of the
split sentence on the ground that it was an encroachment upon the powers of
the governor and the parole board. Rightnour v. Gladdin, 219 Ore. 342k
347 P.2d 103 (1959).
" An early case, State v. Whitt, 117 N.C. 804, 23 S.E. 452 (1895), held
that even though the defendant had served six days of a term of imprison-
ment, the trial judge still could suspend sentence if such change were made
during the term of court in which the defendant had been convicted. This
rule has been preserved in later decisions. E.g., State v. Gross, 230 N.C.
734, 55 S.E.2d 517 (1949).
2 T N.C. CoNsT. art. III, § 6. This amendment terminated the governor's




the allowance of this type sentence would not in any degree diminish
the power of the parole board. In instances where sentence is
suspended in its entirety the parole board does not become involved
in the matter at all. Should the split sentence be utilized there
seems to be no sound reason why the parole board could not act
once the prisoner is incarcerated exactly as it would in any other
case. By statute 8 a prisoner is eligible for consideration for parole
upon completing service of one-fourth of the sentence imposed. The
parole board's action should be on the basis of the entire sentence,
however, and not merely on just the active part. If parole were
granted before the expiration of the active term the effect would be
cancellation of the remaining conditions imposed by the court.29
It should be remembered that both the judge and the parole board
are working toward the same objective-the prisoner's ultimate
return as a useful member of society. The judge's action when he
imposes sentence is prospective; the parole board's action when it
reviews the prisoner's record and considers parole is retrospective.
The latter complements the former and serves as a safeguard against
the court's mistakes.
The usefulness of the split sentence as a working tool in the
hands of the trial judge is instantly apparent. He has first-hand
knowledge of all the facts and circumstances surrounding a par-
ticular case. In fixing punishment he usually will consider the nature
of the act, motive and provocation, presence or absence of repeated
criminal acts on the part of the offender, instigation or acquiescence,
open and deliberate flouting of the law, and the possible effect of
the sentence on the offender."0  Oftentimes offenses are committed
under circumstances such that imposition of an extended prison term
is not warranted; still the infraction may be so serious that a judge
cannot with clear conscience suspend sentence completely. Further,
it is well recognized that prolonged association with hardened crim-
inals may have a substantial contaminating effect ;31 the trial judge
28N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-58 (1958).
For example, under a sentence like the one in the Lewis case, the
prisoner could be paroled after one year. A subsequent breach of the condi-
tions of parole, however, would result in his return to prison to serve the
entire unexpired term, which would be three years. It is immaterial that
the time for which he was sentenced may have elapsed. State v. Yates, 183
N.C. 753, 111 S.E. 337 (1922).
" Coates, Punishment for Crime in North Carolina, 17 N.C.L. REV. 205,
224 (1939).8 BARNES & TEnma.s, op. cit. supra note 1, at 553. One solution to this
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might well feel that a particular defendant's potential for rehabilita-
tion is good and that an extended prison term would be detrimental
to that promise. Under the rule of the Lewis case, however, the
trial judge is faced with a choice between black or white and has no
authority to consider the shades in between.
It is submitted that accordance of authority to trial judges to
utilize the split sentence would effectively fill the void between the
existing extremes of suspension in entirety or complete active imposi-
tion of the sentence. Presumably this could be legislatively accom-
plished by amending G.S. § 15-197 to provide express authoriza-
tion for partial suspension."2 Such action would allow the judge
to treat the defendant more as an individual and to adapt the
sentence to the offender rather than to the offense. It would effect
recognition of "the differences in men which justify differences in
treatment and the differences in treatment which will achieve the
ends at which we aim.
''83
FRANK W. BULLOCK, JR.
Domestic Relations-Abandonment-Divorce Granted to an
Abandoning Husband After the Wife's Action for Support
By statute in North Carolina,' a husband or wife, having lived
separate and apart from the other for two years, may obtain an
absolute divorce, provided the residence requirement is satisfied.
However, the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that not-
withstanding this statute if the husband has abandoned his wife, she
may set up the abandonment as a bar to his action for divorce.'
problem might be to provide for separation of defendants serving short split
sentences such as is now provided for youthful offenders. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15-212 (Supp. 1959).
"2 Should the North Carolina court adhere to the same reasoning as in the
Lewis case, however, they might regard this as an infringement on the
power of the parole board, and thus hold the provision of the statute to be
of no effect.
"' Coates, supra note 30, at 230.
'N.C. GENr. STAT. § 50-6 (1950).
'Byers v. Byers, 223 N.C. 85, 25 S.E.2d 466 (1943). In this case the
court stated: "It is true, the statute under review provides that either party
may sue for a divorce or for a dissolution of the bonds of matrimony, 'if and
when the husband and wife have lived separate and apart for two years'....
However, it is not to be supposed the General Assembly intended to author-
ize one spouse willfully or wrongfully to abandon the other for a period of
two years and then reward the faithless spouse a divorce for the wrong com-
mitted, in the face of a plea in bar based on such wrong." Id. at 90-91, 25
[Vol. 40
